Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrives in Melbourne today for his third official visit to Australia, making him the most frequent visiting Indian prime minister in the history of bilateral ties. This milestone reflects the remarkable transformation of the Australia–India relationship, which was once contentious due to differing Cold War ideologies but is now firmly cemented as a strategic partnership.
Countering Chinese Ambition
Signed in 2020, the comprehensive strategic partnership is underpinned by a shared assessment from New Delhi and Canberra that a rising China poses significant challenges in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, Australia and India have partnered in numerous bilateral and regional initiatives as a form of deterrence. The most notable is the Quad, a diplomatic partnership between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Initially developed as a disaster relief response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the Quad was revived in 2017–2018 after nearly a decade of inactivity, largely in response to rising Chinese aggression. For India, the catalyst was the 2017 Doklam border crisis; for Australia, it was China's militarisation of the South China Sea. The group addresses shared concerns, including maritime domain awareness and critical mineral supply chain resilience.
However, the Quad's strength has been undermined by US President Donald Trump's apathy towards it and his increasingly tense relationship with Modi. Nevertheless, the Quad remains active, having just concluded its 11th foreign ministers meeting, where ministers announced plans to jointly build a port in Fiji. Alongside Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese recently signing a new security treaty with Fiji, both India and Australia are acting in concert. This united commitment to regional stability and strategic deterrence has been the defining success of the relationship. Bilateral defence cooperation has also deepened, including negotiations on equipment and services, and an agreement to conduct more joint military exercises.
Sort-of Free Trade
Challenges remain, particularly in fully realising the economic potential of ties. An interim trade agreement, the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), was signed and implemented in 2022, increasing market access for both parties. It was a significant political win for India, which had just withdrawn from the world's largest free trade deal, signalling its willingness to pursue deeper economic integration with trusted strategic partners. However, the road to a full free trade agreement has proven long and arduous, with no clear timelines for a final deal. Discussions have centred around tariff concessions and trade rules—historically sensitive political issues, especially in sectors like agriculture.
A Friendship of Pragmatism
While Modi and Albanese share similar geopolitical goals, their styles of government differ markedly. In India, Modi has faced criticism over an increasingly centralised exercise of power, with concerns about political influence over independent institutions and tighter restrictions on civil society and dissenting voices. Yet the bilateral relationship has largely been insulated from these differing political orientations because both leaders have prioritised common interests over values. It is a relationship of pragmatism. Where differences remain, such as concerns about democratic freedoms or minority rights in India, Australia has raised the issues, but the understanding is that these are domestic matters for India.
The Power of the Diaspora
A growing area of both opportunity and challenge is the role of the Indian diaspora in Australia. Indians are now the largest overseas-born migrant group in Australia, marking a significant shift from the historically British-derived demographic identity. Modi's visit centres around a massive event, "Melbourne meets Modi," focused on engaging with the diaspora. Indians in Australia carry significant economic weight and business linkages with their home country, potentially enhancing commercial ties. However, using the diaspora purely for economic gain amid polarising anti-immigrant social movements could weaken social cohesion. Reducing a community to its economic value alone overlooks its civic, social, and political contributions, creating a sense of transactional belonging that may heighten resentment.
For Modi, the diaspora is a diplomatic asset—a form of soft power demonstrating India's influence and reach internationally. He will undoubtedly play it up during the visit. But for a more mature bilateral relationship, the diaspora should not be reduced to an instrument of Australia's economic objectives or India's geopolitical messaging. As the world grapples with uncertain US policy and intensifying Chinese competition in the Indo-Pacific, Australia and India are more strategically valuable to one another than ever before. As great powers recalibrate their policies, middle powers must shoulder more responsibility in shaping regional order. Modi's visit should propel political goodwill, but the hard work on both sides will continue long after the Indian prime minister flies home via New Zealand.
