Poland and the Baltic states are grappling with a nightmare scenario: what if Russia attacks and the United States does not come to their aid? This fear has intensified since Donald Trump returned to the White House, with officials privately questioning the reliability of US security guarantees.
US Officials Sidestep Commitment Questions
In mid-May, at a gathering in Tallinn, US Undersecretary of State Thomas DiNanno was asked directly whether American troops would fight if Russia invaded the Baltic states. He shifted uncomfortably and gave a meandering answer that did not include the word "yes." Politicians from the region usually sidestep the issue in public, claiming Washington's commitment remains strong. "We shouldn't pour fuel on the fire," one minister said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Others admit the relationship is fraught. Dovilė Šakalienė, a former Lithuanian defence minister, compared it to "a dysfunctional family where divorce is not an option." In private, informal conversations are taking place in whispers: What would the response to a Russian attack look like if the US did not show up? Should Europe do everything to keep Trump on side, or prepare for Washington's absence?
From Cautious Approval to Real Doubts
This account tracks discussions in eastern Europe over the 18 months since Trump took office, drawing on interviews with dozens of officials. The prevailing mood has morphed from cautious approval of his demands for Europe to spend more into real doubts over US commitment to collective defence. One senior official described a sense of bemused disillusionment: "What do you do when your beloved father figure suddenly starts drinking and behaving in a way that is utterly incomprehensible?"
The first warning shots came in February 2025, when US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth visited Nato headquarters in Brussels. He told allies that European security would no longer be a priority for Washington and that Europe had to step up and pay for its own defence. "Values are important, but you can't shoot values," Hegseth said. The German defence minister, Boris Pistorius, asked for a timetable for the US drawdown, but the idea was not popular. "Lots of us were upset with Pistorius," said one European official present. "The feeling was that the Americans haven't even made their mind up yet, so don't tempt them."
Ukraine Humiliation and Intelligence Cutoff
Two weeks later, Trump humiliated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during a televised White House showdown. Soon after, the US halted intelligence-sharing with Ukraine, a decision reversed after little more than a week but leaving a lasting impression. The moment had a particular impact on Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and his inner circle. "It felt like the ground shifting beneath their feet," said one well-connected source in Warsaw.
A senior European official raised concerns directly to then US National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, asking how the US could abandon Ukraine in the middle of a war. Waltz said Ukraine was different and that such a decision would never be taken with regards to a Nato ally. The official pushed back: "In these kinds of discussions, what people believe is almost more important than what the reality would be."
The Hague Summit and Trump's Personal Diplomacy
In June, the annual Nato summit took place in The Hague amid apocalyptic predictions that Trump could use it to sound the death knell of the alliance. In the end, the summit was a success, largely thanks to efforts of Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte, who made it his personal mission to keep Trump happy. Member states committed to raise defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. Rutte's fawning, including calling Trump "daddy" on the sidelines, was seen as distasteful but tolerable. "It's cringe, but most European leaders are fine with it as long as he delivers Trump," said one Nato official.
The summit's afterglow allowed some to argue that Trump could be a net positive. Former Estonian President Kersti Kaljulaid said: "Barack Obama and Joe Biden asked politely for Europeans to spend more and it got us nowhere. It is only by being impolite and insistent that you can get Europe to change."
Russian Drones and Greenland Threats
In September, about 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace in a single night, testing Nato's red lines. US chief commander in Europe Alexus Grynkewich opened corridors for Dutch F-35 pilots to join Polish F-16s in shooting down many drones. But Trump posted an excited "Here we go!" on social media and later suggested it "could have been a mistake." Poland's Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski rebuked Trump: "You can believe that one or two veer off target, but 19 mistakes in one night, over seven hours, sorry, I don't believe it."
In January, Trump doubled down on threats to annex Greenland from Denmark, a fellow Nato member. Some national capitals wrote alarmed requests asking if Denmark could invoke Article 5. One Nato diplomat described the feeling as like looking into an abyss. The scare passed with deft diplomacy from Rutte.
Troop Rotations and Personalisation of Power
In mid-May, Poland was shocked to learn that a rotation of 4,000 US troops scheduled for deployment had been cancelled. Some had already arrived. "We're trying to find out what's happening, but it's hard to find an American who knows what's happening," said one official. Trump soon reversed the cancellation via a Truth Social post, citing his friendly ties with Poland's nationalist president, Karol Nawrocki. The implication was that troop levels could depend on Trump's personal relationships.
The personalisation of power means every engagement where Trump is present takes on outsized importance. This year's Nato summit will take place in Ankara in July, hosted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, Hegseth came to Nato again last week and delivered another combative address, blasting as "shameful" the decision by many European countries not to allow basing rights for Washington's Iran war, and attacking Europe for focusing on "gender equity and climate change" instead of "tanks and fighters and air defences."
Europe's Choice: Placate or Prepare
Throughout the turbulence, Europe has faced a choice: do everything to placate Trump and hope the next US president is more predictable, or speak publicly about frustrations and prepare for a future without the US. Rutte has told Nato leaders there is nothing to be gained from airing anger in public. Most European leaders agree, although Giorgia Meloni's acrimonious spat with Trump last week shows patience is wearing thin.
Among eastern European nations, the Polish government has become an increasingly vocal outlier. "We have been and will remain a loyal ally of America, but we cannot be suckers," Sikorski told parliament in February. In the Baltic states, caution still dominates. Estonia's Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said panic over the future of the transatlantic relationship was misplaced. But Dr Kristi Raik of the ICDS thinktank said this consensus might soon need to be overhauled: "We cannot prepare ourselves for this possible future scenario if people are too scared to talk about it."
Hard Power Gaps and European Efforts
Several European countries have sent troops to the Baltics under Nato, most symbolically Germany, which is deploying a full brigade to Lithuania. The EU has created a new role of defence commissioner, and French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to extend France's nuclear umbrella over more countries. However, elements of US hard power are difficult to replace. High-quality air defence systems, deep-strike capabilities, and intelligence gathering are key gaps. A senior European intelligence official said the combined collection capabilities on Russia of all Nato intelligence agencies minus the US still amount to "less than the US produces on its own."
Rutte said bluntly: "If anyone thinks that the European Union, or Europe as a whole, can defend itself without the US, keep on dreaming. You can't." Most in eastern Europe agree. Sikorski said some kind of US drawdown was inevitable, expecting a "Nato Mark 3" where Europe shoulders more burden and the US is "a cavalry-over-the-hill kind of ally." Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže agreed: "Over the medium to long term, we should be able to handle a threat like Russia conventionally, with the US providing extended nuclear deterrence."
Uncertainty and the Kremlin's Calculus
Two problems remain: western European governments have balked at prioritising defence over other spending, as demonstrated when UK Defence Secretary John Healey resigned. Second, there is doubt the US will commit to an orderly shifting of burdens. If Trump is more constrained after the midterms, unpredictability may decrease, but the possibility of JD Vance entering the Oval Office could result in a more zealous US withdrawal.
The key question is whether public tensions have eroded the perception in the Kremlin that an incursion into Nato territory would provoke an overwhelming response. Lithuania's Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys said: "I'm more concerned about the projection of unity that we're showing to Russia, that they could find themselves making the crazy assessment that maybe it's the right time."
During Estonia's annual "spring storm" military exercises, 44,000 soldiers and volunteers participated. As long as the Russian army remains tied up in Ukraine, the Kremlin has little capacity for a traditional attack. "We don't see it. There are no capabilities," said Tsahkna. Instead, Putin is likely to continue with hybrid attacks. How might Washington react if dozens of Russian kamikaze drones hit Warsaw or a Baltic capital? These are the questions that keep regional security officials awake at night.
One disaster scenario is presented in If Russia Wins: A Scenario by German academic Carlo Masala, which covers a hypothetical crisis in spring 2028 where Russia tests Nato by rolling tanks into Narva, Estonia. In the scenario, a Trump-like US president tells allies: "I'm not going to risk World War III over some small town in Estonia." Some officials said the scenario was nonsensical due to increased authority vested in Nato's military commanders since 2022. Nato's top commander in Europe now has authority to reinforce border zones as soon as there are signs of Russian preparation. But Masala noted that political control means troop movements could be overruled by a single phone call.
This uncertainty sits at the core of European concerns. Jana Puglierin of the European Council on Foreign Relations calls it "Schrödinger's Nato" – a state of ambiguity over whether the US is in or out. "Nobody knows the real status of the relationship until we 'open the box' – until Nato is tested militarily," she said. "But by then, it might be too late for the Europeans."
